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IF YOU CAN'T BUILD IT, THEY WON'T 
COME: CONDOMINIUM CONSTRUCTION 
MORATORIA AND GENTRIFICATION 
Dara K. Newman* 
Abstract: The increasing presence of bright, new condominium devel-
opment in America’s cities is changing the composition and appearance 
of these urban landscapes. Long-time local residents in gentrifying areas 
are confronted daily with the impacts of development, and are search-
ing for tools to preserve their communities and keep them affordable. 
One response has been proposed moratoria on condominium construc-
tion. This approach aims to stop the influx of more affluent individuals 
into urban neighborhoods by preventing the construction of higher-end 
condominiums. This Note examines the validity of such moratoria on 
condominium construction as an exercise of the police power. Through 
a comparison to rent control ordinances and condominium conversion 
moratoria, it argues that valid condominium construction moratoria 
can be implemented to address social and economic concerns. The 
Note concludes, however, that valid construction moratoria are not al-
ways the most appropriate or effective growth management tool to ad-
dress a gentrifying community’s needs. 
Introduction 
 America’s cities and towns are constantly changing, complex envi-
ronments.1 Growth and development in urban areas are influenced by 
many different forces, such as economic trends, new immigrant popu-
lations, local residents, and local businesses.2 Urban planners and state 
regulators strive to develop land use regulations that interact with out-
side development forces in a way that creates desirable and livable local 
communities.3 
                                                                                                                      
* Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2007–08. 
1 See Jane Jacobs, Foreword to Chester Hartman, Between Eminence and Notori-
ety: Four Decades of Radical Urban Planning, at xiii, xiv (2002); Jane Jacobs, The 
Death and Life of Great American Cities 6 (Vintage Books 1992) (1961). 
2 See David L. Callies et al., Cases and Materials on Land Use 1 (4th ed. 2004); 
Hartman, supra note 1, at 120. 
3 See Callies et al., supra note 2, at 13; Jacobs, supra note 1, at 8. Zoning is an impor-
tant tool that regulators use to control the growth and development of a city. See Daniel J. 
Curtin, Jr. & Cecily T. Talbert, Curtin’s California Land Use and Planning Law 43 
(26th ed. 2006). Regulators enact zoning laws to prescribe the particular uses that are al-
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 Over the past two decades, a resurgence of economic activity in 
urban areas resulted in population growth in the country’s cities.4 
One aspect of this growth, especially in the past ten years, has been a 
surge in the development of high-end condominiums in lower-income 
urban communities.5 This development is changing the demographic 
compositions and economies in areas where new condominiums are 
prevalent.6 As a result, local communities are concerned with the ef-
fects of this new growth and residents are looking for ways to address 
the increasing impacts on their neighborhoods.7 One tool that is be-
ing explored to slow new condominium development and its effects is 
the imposition of moratoria on their construction.8 
 Planners routinely use moratoria as growth management devices.9 
Moratoria that specifically prohibit new condominium construction as 
a way to confront the social conditions of an area, however, are a recent 
development.10 The condominium construction moratoria now being 
proposed have the broad goals of preserving the character and compo-
sition of local communities.11 This Note analyzes the issue of whether 
cities can legally regulate growth and development based on social 
grounds, such as gentrification resulting from an overabundance of 
higher-end development. Specifically, it addresses this issue by examin-
ing the validity of potential moratoria on condominium construction as 
a mechanism for discouraging gentrification and stabilizing high vol-
umes of condominium development plans. 
 Part I of this Note describes the extent of condominium develop-
ment in American cities over the past decade and the gentrification 
process that frequently coincides with this new construction. This part 
also introduces the concept of condominium construction moratoria 
                                                                                                                      
lowed within different city districts. See id. Exactions are another tool used to ensure that 
development forces have a positive impact on local communities. See id. at 325. With exac-
tions, “The developer, in return for [development approval,] . . . agrees to donate to the 
city an amount of land or money needed to provide certain services and amenities necessi-
tated by the anticipated influx of new residents . . . as a result of such development.” Id. 
4 See Boston Redev. Auth., New Century Begins with Building Boom: 90s End with Strong De-
velopment in Many Sectors, 01-1 Insight 1 (2001), available at http://www.cityofboston.gov/ 
bra/PDF/ResearchPublications/newcentury.pdf. 
5 See Christine McConville, Growing Pains in Southie: Building Boom Brings an Earful of 
Complaints About Noise, Boston Globe, Oct. 9, 2006, at B1. 
6 See Hartman, supra note 1, at 120–21. 
7 McConville, supra note 5, at B1. 
8 Id. 
9 Brian W. Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein, Federal Land Use Law & Litigation 
128 (2006). 
10 See id. 
11 See McConville, supra note 5, at B1. 
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and examines community responses to these proposed regulations. Part 
II examines land use regulations, with a focus on moratoria, as a proper 
exercise of the police power. It reviews the history of land-use regulation 
and discusses the standards for evaluating the validity of a moratorium 
ordinance. Part III reviews the history of rent control ordinances and 
condominium conversion moratoria to develop a framework for assess-
ing condominium construction moratoria. Part IV considers condomin-
ium construction moratoria in light of the framework established in Part 
III, and draws analogies to predict how a court would examine a chal-
lenged construction moratorium. Part IV also discusses the efficacy of 
condominium construction moratoria and suggests alternative growth 
management approaches to use when moratoria are not the most effec-
tive solution to a community’s needs. 
I. Rapid Real Estate Growth and Its Effects: Condominium 
Construction Moratoria as a Response 
A. The Condominium Construction Boom 
 Beginning in the early 2000s, many American cities experienced a 
boom of construction, including new condominium construction.12 The 
impact of this rapid and large-scale growth is a major issue confronting 
cities and towns throughout the country.13 While the real estate market 
slowed in some cities in mid-2006 and has continued to slow in 2007 and 
early 2008, as of the time of publication, there is still rapid condomin-
ium construction underway and planned for the future in many large 
urban areas.14 In early 2006, Boston’s planning agency projected that 
                                                                                                                      
12 See Tom Acitelli, Mayor Trumpets Building Boom, But We’re Still Bursting at the Seams, 
N.Y. Observer, Feb. 26, 2007, at 30, available at http://www.observer.com/node/36793; 
James R. Hagerty & Ruth Simon, Housing Glut Gives Buyers Upper Hand: As Spring Home-
Shopping Season Looms, Supply Mounts and Prices Fall in Some Areas; Builders See Slow Recovery, 
Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 2007, at D1; Robert Andrew Powell, Amid the Shipyards and Lobster 
Traps, Condos, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 2003, at F1; Boston Redev. Auth., supra note 4, at 1. 
13 See Curtin & Talbert, supra note 3, at 409. 
14 Kimberly Blanton, Developers Throw in Extras to Seal Condo Deals, Boston Globe, Feb. 22, 
2006, at A1; Les Christie, Shiller: Real Estate Is Risky Business: Economist Robert Shiller Points to Several 
Indicators That Suggest Prices Are Out of Whack, CNNMoney.com, June 16, 2006, http:// 
money.cnn.com/2006/06/16/real_estate/buying_selling/Shiller_weighs_in_on_housing; 
Steve Kerch, The Frenzy Fizzles: Condo Market Runs Aground for Investors, But Core Buyers Re-
main, MarketWatch, Feb. 8, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/condo-market-
runs-aground-investors/story.aspx?guid=%7B9BDFBE64-9DF0-4FDA-B08E-FA9DCF9059A8%7D 
&dist. The large number of condominiums on the market indicates slowing sales: the 
number of condominium listings have increased from January 2006 to January 2007 
eighty-six percent in Las Vegas, forty-three percent in Washington, D.C., and twenty-one 
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14,000 condominium units were under construction or approved for 
construction and that approximately 1000 new condominium units 
would be placed on the Boston market annually for the following five 
years.15 Cities and towns must now assess how to manage this growth.16 
B. Condominium Construction and Gentrification 
 New construction in urban areas often attracts an influx of new 
residents and can lead to gentrification.17 Gentrification is the process 
by which relatively more affluent individuals move into lower-income 
areas.18 An increase in wealthier residents often results in displacement 
of the area’s existing residents due to rising housing costs.19 The con-
cept of gentrification emerged in the United States in the 1960s, when 
private-market investment in cities’ downtown areas expanded urban 
economies.20 
 Gentrification studies show that a surge in a group of new resi-
dents impacts an area by replacing the existing population.21 Local 
government officials and planners often view this process as a positive 
development “because of the perceived social and economic benefits 
that may accrue from [gentrification].”22 As new residents with higher 
incomes enter a community, they introduce more capital and buying 
power into the local economy, which can bring new businesses and jobs 
to the area.23 Higher-priced housing and residents with higher incomes 
                                                                                                                      
percent in the Northern Virginia suburbs of Washington, D.C. Hagerty & Simon, supra 
note 12, at D1. 
15 Blanton, supra note 14, at A1. 
16 See Curtin & Talbert, supra note 3, at 409. 
17 See Callies et al., supra note 2, at 671. 
18 Id; Hartman, supra note 1, at 109. 
19 Peter J. Macdonald, Displacement in Gentrifying Neighborhoods: Regulating Condominium 
Conversion Through Municipal Land Use Controls, 63 B.U. L. Rev. 955, 955 & n.6 (1983). 
20 Sharon Zukin, Gentrification: Culture and Capital in the Urban Core, 13 Ann. Rev. Soc. 
129, 129 (1987). The displacement described by the term gentrification is currently un-
derstood as displacement due to private market forces. Hartman, supra note 1, at 120. 
This understanding “represents a shift from the 1950s and 1960s, when government pro-
grams, particularly urban renewal and construction of the interstate highway system, were 
the primary displacement forces.” Id. at 120–21. 
21 Zukin, supra note 20, at 135. 
22 Henry W. McGee, Jr., Afro-American Resistance to Gentrification and the Demise of Integra-
tionist Ideology in the United States, 23 Urb. Law. 25, 30 (1991) (quoting James H. Johnson, 
Gentrification and Incumbent Upgrading: Benefits and Costs, UCLA Center for Afro-Am. 
Stud. Newsl. (UCLA Ctr. for Afro-Am. Studies, L.A., Cal.), Nov. 1981, at 10). 
23 See id. 
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also increase the local tax base, infusing previously blighted areas with 
more capital for public services, facilities, and infrastructure.24 
 Conversely, opponents of gentrification assert that local, often mi-
nority, residents suffer detrimental social and economic consequences 
as a result of the influx of new development and new residents.25 The 
increased density of rapid gentrification can add excessive stress to lo-
cal infrastructure, such as sewers, streets, and sidewalks, and strain ser-
vices such as fire and police coverage.26 It can also drastically reduce 
affordable housing options in a neighborhood and increase residential 
property taxes.27 Strong community populations that may have been 
living in an area for generations can be displaced as housing costs rise 
and long-time residents are forced to move in search of more afford-
able neighborhoods.28 
C. Too Many Condominiums on the Market 
 In mid-2006 the condominium markets in large cities—such as 
Washington, D.C., Las Vegas, Miami, and Boston—collapsed, resulting 
in an overabundance of new condominiums on the market.29 In Febru-
ary 2006, there were 1369 condominiums for sale in downtown Boston, 
compared to only 880 in February 2005.30 In the Washington, D.C. area 
there were 24,200 condominium units on the market at the end of 
2006, compared to 13,000 at the beginning of 2005.31 This increase in 
                                                                                                                      
24 See id.; Matt Viser, Breaching Mass. Ave.; Gentrification that Touched the East Side of Bos-
ton’s South End is Finally Expanding Across an Imaginary Dividing Line Towards a Once Neglected 
Neighborhood, Boston Globe, Jan. 14, 2007, at H1 (commenting that new condominium 
development in a “gritty” neighborhood led to cleaner sidewalks, buildings painted in 
subtler colors, and a restaurant changing its name to sound more upscale). 
25 McGee, supra note 22, at 30. 
26 See Christina Pazzanese, Not Open Studios, But Fort Point Draws Crowd, Boston Globe, 
Apr. 1, 2007, at City Weekly 4. 
27 Id. 
28 Hartman, supra note 1, at 121; Shaila Dewan, Gentrification Changing Face of New At-
lanta: Historic Black Share of Population Declines, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 2006, at A1 (“[A]l-
though gentrification has expanded the city’s tax base and weeded out blight, it has had 
an unintended effect on Atlanta . . . . For the first time since the 1920s, the black share of 
the city’s population is declining and the white percentage is on the rise.”). 
29 Vikas Bajaj, Buyers Scarce, Many Condos Are for Rent, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 2007, at A1; 
Blanton, supra note 14, at A1. The National Association of Home Builders/Fannie Mae 
Multifamily Condo Market Index, which tracks builder confidence in the condominium 
housing market on a scale of zero to 100, fell to 19.7 in the third-quarter of 2006, com-
pared to 47.1 in the third-quarter of 2005. Builders Remain Worried About Condo Market 
Weakness, Mortgage Banking, Jan. 2007, at 131. 
30 Blanton, supra note 14, at A1. 
31 Bajaj, supra note 29, at A1. 
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D.C. condominiums corresponds to slowing sales, which dropped from 
3520 in the first quarter of 2005 to 663 in the fourth quarter of 2006.32 
 As a result of the overabundance of condominiums on the market, 
some developers have decided to rent their units until the condomin-
ium surplus shrinks.33 There is no national data source of new condo-
minium sales; however, overall condominium sales fell 13.6% from No-
vember 2005 to November 2006.34 If regulation is found to be an 
appropriate response to the impacts of the high volume of condomin-
ium construction, then imposing condominium construction morato-
ria is one regulatory approach that addresses this issue.35 
D. Condominium Moratorium Regulations 
 A condominium construction moratorium prohibits the construc-
tion of new condominiums in a certain area for a specified period of 
time.36 Local governments and residents in some urban communities 
support condominium construction moratoria as a means of address-
ing the social and economic impacts of new condominiums on local 
neighborhoods.37 For example, in Austin, Texas, long-time residents of 
the city’s east side asked the City Council in December 2006 to institute 
a moratorium on condominium construction.38 The east side is home 
to a large portion of Austin’s Latino community, and residents viewed 
the moratorium as a way to prevent population displacement.39 One 
resident explained, “We’re trying to preserve and maintain the charac-
                                                                                                                      
32 Id. 
33 Id.; Kerch, supra note 14. 
34 Bajaj, supra note 29, at A1. 
35 See McConville, supra note 5, at B1; Leslie Coons, East Austin Residents Seek 90-Day 
Condo Moratorium, CBS 42 Morning News, Dec. 14, 2006, http://www.keyetv.com/news/ 
local/story.aspx?content_id=9192724A-7538-443A-97CE-BCC7386C5F23&gsa=true. 
36 See 10 Patrick J. Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls § 53C.08[10] (Eric 
Damian Kelly ed., 2003). A condominium construction moratorium is different from a con-
dominium conversion moratorium. See discussion infra Part III.B. The conversion moratoria 
do not address new construction of condominiums, but the conversion of existing rental 
apartment buildings into condominium buildings. See Callies et al., supra note 2, at 671. 
37 See McConville, supra note 5, at B1; Coons, supra note 35. While not the focus of this 
Note, condominium moratoria are also used as a growth management tool outside of ur-
ban areas. Denny Lee, Time Catches Up with a Georgia Eden, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 2004, at F1. 
In the Georgia beach community of Tybee Island, the City Council imposed a moratorium 
on condominium construction in 1999 to fight a building surge that was replacing wooden 
cottages with multi-story condominiums. Id. 
38 Coons, supra note 35. 
39 Id. 
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ter and culture of the neighborhoods.”40 The situation in Austin exem-
plifies typical community reaction to the gentrification process.41 
 Similarly, in late 2006, residents in South Boston advocated for a 
moratorium on new development in response to the recent building 
boom of high-end condominiums.42 A state representative, Brian P. 
Wallace, agreed to work with residents to address their concerns and 
consider the building moratorium.43 The new construction in the area 
was attracting more affluent young adults, while displacing members of 
South Boston’s historically Irish Catholic working class community.44 
Residents viewed the moratorium as a way to preserve the character of 
the neighborhood and fight concerns of overdevelopment, increased 
congestion, and displacement of low-income and elderly residents.45 
 Critics of development moratoria assert that such moratoria can 
unintentionally result in increased development by motivating devel-
opers to fast-track otherwise dormant or slow-moving development 
plans.46 Robert D. Yaro, president of the Regional Plan Association in 
Manhattan explained, “At the first mention of a moratorium . . . you 
shake out . . . development proposals that might not have been ready 
for years. And in many cases these end up getting far enough into the 
process that they are vested.”47 If this result occurs, the moratorium 
adds to the problem that it was implemented to resolve.48 
 Condominium construction moratoria are also criticized by parties 
affected by the development freeze.49 Prohibiting or limiting develop-
ment can elicit strong negative responses from landowners, developers, 
and businesspeople, making moratoria politically charged topics.50 For 
                                                                                                                      
40 Id. 
41 See Macdonald, supra note19, at 960; Coons, supra note 35. 
42 McConville, supra note 5, at B1. 
43 Id. 
44 See id. 
45 Id. 
46 John Rather, Do Moratoriums Help or Hinder?, N.Y. Times, July 28, 2002, at LI1. 
47 Id. The courts have not directly addressed the validity of condominium construction 
moratoria. 
48 See id. 
49 See Ann E. Marimow, Leaders Offer Alternative to Building Moratorium, Wash. Post, Jan. 
26, 2007, at B4 [hereinafter Marimow, Moratorium Alternative]; Miranda S. Spivack, Rockville 
Weighs Moratorium on Construction: Council Debates a Less-Sweeping Plan to Stop Development 
While Zoning Rules Are Reviewed, Wash Post, Nov. 9, 2006, at Montgomery Extra 1. 
50 See Editorial, A Flexible Moratorium? Don’t Let the Pendulum Swing Too Far Back, Wash. 
Post, Jan. 16, 2007, at A18 (commenting on a proposed moratorium in Montgomery 
County that would freeze building permits in the county, criticizing moratorium generally 
as unappealing means of controlling growth, and stressing the importance of limiting the 
length of moratorium to a “brief” period of time); Ann E. Marimow, Council Forgoes Morato-
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example, a proposed moratorium on new building projects in Mont-
gomery County, Maryland received such strong opposition from devel-
opers and other community members that the County abandoned the 
moratorium ordinance.51 As an alternative, the County stated that it 
hoped to achieve the goals of the moratorium through less drastic 
growth controls, such as impact fees and more stringent permit ap-
proval requirements.52 
II. Land Use Controls as a Proper Exercise of the Police Power 
A. Growth Management Tools 
 Planners and regulators use growth management tools to steer ur-
ban growth.53 Some of these regulations directly address infrastructure 
needs, while others tackle broader social aspects of growing municipali-
ties.54 The development moratorium is one way that regulators manage 
growth.55 Moratoria are one of the “most drastic of all the growth man-
agement techniques” because they completely prohibit certain devel-
opment, or limit development permit approval, for a certain period of 
time.56 
B. Moratorium Ordinances 
 A moratorium is “an authorized delay in the provision of govern-
ment services or development approval.”57 Municipalities adopt mora-
                                                                                                                      
rium in Favor of Compromise, Wash. Post, Jan. 31, 2007, at B7 [hereinafter Marimow, Council 
Forgoes Moratorium]; Marimow, Moratorium Alternative, supra note 49, at B4. 
51 Marimow, Council Forgoes Moratorium, supra note 50, at B7. 
52 Marimow, Moratorium Alternative, supra note 49, at B4. 
53 Curtin & Talbert, supra note 3, at 405 (explaining that growth management tools 
include, but are not limited to, a general plan, specific plans, zoning ordinances, and de-
velopment moratoria). 
54 Id. at 404 (explaining that some growth management regulations address “limited 
sewer capacity, water shortages, revenue shortages, school overcrowding, and traffic con-
gestion,” while others are used to maintain “the community’s unique character, the pres-
ervation of open space, lower densities, and preservation of scenic views”). 
55 Id. at 405. 
56 Id. 
57 Rohan, supra note 36, § 53C.08[10] (quoting Robert Meltz et al., The Takings Is-
sue: Constitutional Limits on Land Use Control and Environmental Regulation 
266 (1999)). A municipality adopting a moratorium must have the authority to do so. Id. 
§ 22, at 22-1. In some states, local municipalities have express statutory authority to adopt 
such growth management regulations. Id. In other states, however, the authority is not as 
clear. Id. This Note does not examine the issue of authority for enactment; its examination of 
moratoria assumes that authority exists. 
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torium ordinances to address a number of different problems, such as 
strained infrastructure, sprawling growth, housing needs, diminishing 
open space, and detrimental environmental impacts.58 Los Angeles, for 
example, implemented a moratorium to address an affordable housing 
issue.59 In May 2006, the City Council banned the demolition of single-
room occupancy dwellings in a fifty-square-block area of downtown, 
which housed close to 10,000 low-income residents, for a year while city 
officials determined how to preserve the availability of affordable hous-
ing in the rapidly gentrifying area.60 
 Development moratoria, which prohibit or limit development ap-
proval, are often used to allow municipalities time to review compre-
hensive land use plans, to develop and implement new zoning ordi-
nances, or to increase needed public facilities.61 Moratoria are designed 
to freeze development while the municipality determines appropriate 
ways to ensure that future growth positively, rather than negatively, im-
pacts the area.62 
 It follows from the typical goals of development moratoria that 
valid regulations will have a definite time frame and will end once the 
purpose for the moratorium’s enactment has been addressed.63 The 
municipality implementing the moratorium must have an analytically 
supported plan of action and must make reasonable efforts to address 
the purpose during the course of the moratorium.64 For example, a 
traditionally suburban area facing a spike in the construction of new 
homes could implement a moratorium on new housing development 
until the planning department completed a growth management plan 
that dictated where new construction could take place, in order to pre-
serve open space in the community.65 There is no standard outer limit 
on an acceptable time frame for a moratorium; the requirement is only 
                                                                                                                      
58 See Blaesser & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 128; Rohan, supra note 36, § 22.01[1]; 
Spivack, supra note 49, at Montgomery Extra 1 (reporting that Rockville, Maryland Mayor 
Larry Giammo supported a proposed moratorium on new development while the city 
examined its zoning laws because he was “concerned about weaknesses in local zoning laws 
that . . . [did] not require enough open space, wide enough sidewalks or recessed upper 
floors of high rises to allow more light to filter to the street”). 
59 Andrew Glazer, Los Angeles Moratorium Puts Skid Row Gentrification on Hold: Affordable 
Housing for Thousands Endangered by Development, Wash. Post, May 20, 2006, at F32. 
60 Id. 
61 Blaesser & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 128; Rohan, supra note 36, § 22.01[1]. 
62 Blaesser & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 129. 
63 Rohan, supra note 36, § 53C.08[10]. 
64 Blaesser & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 129. 
65 See id. 
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that the moratorium have a reasonable time limitation.66 In many 
states, however, the legislation authorizing moratoria and other interim 
ordinances includes specific time limits for these growth management 
tools.67 
 A moratorium ordinance can be challenged as an invalid exercise 
of the police power.68 Moratoria based on substantiated health, safety, 
or general welfare needs, however, are unlikely to be struck down by 
courts.69 In addition, a moratorium with restrictions that taper off or 
terminate as certain goals or outcomes are attained has a strong chance 
of surviving legal attacks.70 Moratoria are generally upheld as long as 
they address a valid purpose under the police power and have a tempo-
rary timeframe linked to the completion of certain needs or goals.71 
C. The Police Power as the Basis for Land Use Ordinances 
 States have the power to enact regulations as an exercise of their 
police power.72 The concept of the police power is so broad and flexi-
ble that it is difficult to define.73 U.S. Supreme Court Justice William 
Douglas commented that “[a]n attempt to define [the police power’s] 
reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its 
own facts.”74 Generally stated, the police power allows states to enact 
regulations that relate to the safety, health, or general welfare of the 
public.75 Common regulations under the police power address issues 
such as “[p]ublic safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, [and] 
law and order.”76 
                                                                                                                      
66 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
353–54 (2002) (discussing different time-periods for moratoria and noting that various 
moratoria of 120 days, eighteen months, and two years were acceptable to the Court, but a 
moratorium “lasting nearly six years—bears no resemblance to the short-term nature of 
traditional moratoria”); Curtin & Talbert, supra note 3, at 297. 
67 Curtin & Talbert, supra note 3, at 297. 
68 See John J. Delaney et al., Handling the Land Use Case § 28:5 (3d ed. 2007). 
Moratoria are also challenged on substantive due process and constitutional takings 
grounds, but these challenges will not be addressed in this Note. Blaesser & Weinstein, 
supra note 9, at 128. 
69 Curtin & Talbert, supra note 3, at 298. 
70 Id. 
71 Delaney, supra note 68, § 28:5. 
72 Steven J. Eagle, Regulatory Takings 223 (3d ed. 2005). 
73 Markus Dirk Dubber, The Police Power 120 (2005); Donna Jalbert Patalano, 
Note, Police Power and the Public Trust: Prescriptive Zoning Through the Conflation of Two Ancient 
Doctrines, 28 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 683, 707 (2001). 
74 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
75 Eagle, supra note 72, at 224 (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 49 (1905)). 
76 Berman, 348 U.S. at 32. 
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 A court will give great deference to the legislature when reviewing 
a regulation or ordinance that is challenged as an abuse of the police 
power.77 Courts have noted that it is the role of the legislature to iden-
tify and address the public’s needs, and thus, “The role of the judiciary 
in determining whether [the police power] is being exercised for a 
public purpose is an extremely narrow one.”78 Given the broad inter-
pretation of the police power, there are a wide range of purposes 
served by valid land use regulations.79 
 In Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court acknowledged that 
the growing size and impact of urban areas in the United States necessi-
tated land use regulations as a new application of the police power.80 
Euclid established that zoning ordinances “must find their justification in 
some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare.”81 
Therefore, challenges to zoning ordinances require an examination of 
the particular police power underlying the ordinance’s enactment.82 
The Court in Euclid stressed that the line between legitimate and ille-
gitimate uses of the police power was not clearly delineated but, rather, 
must be based on a case-by-case assessment in light of the circumstances 
and conditions of the challenged zoning ordinance.83 The Court stated: 
[T]he question whether the power exists to forbid the erec-
tion of a building of a particular kind or for a particular use 
. . . is to be determined, not by an abstract consideration of 
the building or of the thing considered apart, but by consider-
ing it in connection with the circumstances and the locality.84 
 In Berman v. Parker, the Supreme Court examined the police power 
as the legal basis for land use regulations.85 In Berman, the appellants, 
who owned land within a blighted area slated for redevelopment, 
brought an action to enjoin the condemnation of their property under 
the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act.86 While the majority of 
the property within the area designated for redevelopment consisted of 
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rundown housing, a department store was located on the appellants’ 
property.87 The Act called for the elimination of substandard housing 
and blighted areas in D.C. to promote public welfare, and established 
that it was a public use to acquire and improve property within the 
“slums.”88 The appellants argued that the condemnation of their prop-
erty pursuant to the Act was unconstitutional because their property 
was not being taken to rid the area of “slums,” but “merely to develop a 
better balanced, more attractive community.”89 
 The appellants in Berman challenged the application of the Act to 
their property as beyond the limits of the police power, arguing the Act 
did not promote public welfare.90 The Supreme Court rejected this ar-
gument, concluding that “[t]he concept of the public welfare is broad 
and inclusive.”91 The Court reasoned that because of the broad scope 
of the police power, it was within the power of the legislature to deter-
mine that beautiful and well-balanced communities promote public 
welfare and, thus, to enact legislation based on this determination.92 
 It follows from Berman that growth management regulations such as 
moratoria can be a lawful exercise of the police power.93 For a growth 
management regulation such as a moratorium to fall within the police 
power, however, it must reasonably relate to the public health, safety, or 
welfare of a municipality’s residents.94 
D. Standards for Evaluating the Validity of Moratoria 
 An analysis of a land use regulation must determine whether the 
regulation is appropriate under the police power.95 This analysis  
should assess the purposes of the land use regulation based on judicial 
precedent.96 The Supreme Court of California thoroughly discussed 
the evaluation of growth management ordinances in Associated Home 
Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore.97 There, the court assessed a challenge 
to a local zoning ordinance that prohibited the issuance of residential 
building permits until local education, sewage disposal, and water sup-
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93 See id.; Curtin & Talbert, supra note 3, at 409. 
94 Curtin & Talbert, supra note 3, at 409. 
95 See id. 
96 See id. at 410. 
97 Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 475 (Cal. 1976). 
2008] Condominium Moratoria and Gentrification 605 
ply facilities complied with specified standards.98 The plaintiffs argued 
that the moratorium on building permits exceeded the municipality’s 
authority under the police power.99 
 The court reaffirmed the principle that land use ordinances that 
substantially limit immigration into a community are constitutional if 
they are “reasonably related to the welfare of the region affected by the 
ordinance.”100 In assessing whether the growth restriction related to the 
general welfare, the court adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s view in 
Euclid.101 It explained that as long as it is fairly debatable that the ordi-
nance has a reasonable relationship to general welfare, the ordinance 
will survive a constitutional attack.102 
 The court in City of Livermore also established that if the ordinance 
will affect regions beyond the enacting community, an evaluation of 
public welfare must include an evaluation of the impact on residents in 
surrounding areas.103 Through this evaluation the court incorporated 
the Supreme Court’s stance in Euclid that a police power determination 
requires the development to be considered “in connection with the cir-
cumstances and the locality.”104 The court articulated a three-step proc-
ess for determining whether a growth management ordinance is a valid 
exercise of the police power.105 The court explained: 
The first step in [the] analysis is to forecast the probable ef-
fect and duration of the restriction. . . 
 The second step is to identify the competing interests af-
fected by the restriction. 
 . . . [T]he final step is to determine whether the ordinance, 
in light of its probable impact, represents a reasonable ac-
commodation of the competing interests.106 
As long as the ordinance bears a relationship to health, safety, or wel-
fare after consideration of the three-step process, then the ordinance is 
a valid exercise of the police power.107 
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 In summary, for a land use ordinance to be found unconstitu-
tional, the regulation must be “arbitrary and unreasonable, having no 
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general wel-
fare.”108 The courts give great deference to the legislature in evaluating 
whether a moratorium is reasonably related to public welfare.109 In 
Euclid, the Supreme Court suggested that it would serve the public wel-
fare to enact zoning regulations that preserved the residential charac-
ter of a neighborhood.110 The Court reinforced its broad interpretation 
of the meaning of legitimate purposes under the police power in Village 
of Belle Terre v. Boraas.111 There, the Court reasoned that “[t]he police 
power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy 
places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, 
and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanc-
tuary for people.”112 
III. Land Use Regulations Addressing Social and  
Economic Concerns 
A. Rent Control Regulations 
 Rent control ordinances provide an illustrative example of eco-
nomically motivated regulations that courts have held to be valid exer-
cises of the police power.113 These ordinances stabilize rental prices to 
protect tenants from rapid increases in prices and are popular in urban 
areas with large renter populations.114 Rent control initially emerged as 
a wartime measure.115 The earliest form of rent regulation in the United 
States arose during World War I with the passage of the Soldiers’ and 
Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1918, which, among other things, precluded 
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eviction of military families from rental housing costing a certain, speci-
fied amount.116 
 In 1920, New York enacted the Emergency Housing Laws of the 
State of New York, which were an interrelated group of acts intended to 
address a shortage of housing toward the end of the War.117 In Levy 
Leasing Co. v. Siegel, landlords challenged the constitutionality of these 
laws, specifically the rent control regulations.118 The Supreme Court 
upheld the state court’s finding that the laws were a valid exercise of 
the police power.119 The Court stated: 
 The warrant for this legislative resort to the police power 
was the conviction on the part of the state legislators that 
there existed in the larger cities of the State a social emer-
gency, caused by an insufficient supply of dwelling houses and 
apartments, so grave that it constituted a serious menace to 
the health, morality, comfort, and even to the peace of a large 
part of the people of the State. That . . . unless relieved, the 
public welfare would suffer in respects which constitute the 
primary and undisputed, as well as the most usual, basis and 
justification for exercise of [the police] power.120 
 Rent control significantly expanded during World War II, when 
economic stimulation created the potential for rapid increases in rental 
prices.121 The rent controls enacted during the two world wars were jus-
tified by the economic wartime conditions.122 Eventually, these federal 
controls were lifted in the years following World War II.123 
 In the 1970s, the Nixon administration instituted nationwide price 
regulations that included provisions for controlling rental prices in re-
sponse to inflation concerns.124 These rent controls became permanent 
when they were adopted by state and local governments.125 While the 
wartime controls were a response to emergency wartime conditions, 
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these new rent controls were based on a legal exercise of the police 
power to address more permanent public welfare issues.126 Municipali-
ties enacted rent control ordinances for a variety of reasons, including 
“protect[ing] tenants from landlord abuses[,] . . . reinforc[ing] hous-
ing code compliance[,] . . . [and] limiting the rate at which rents are 
allowed to rise.”127 
 Under the police power, rent control ordinances must have a sub-
stantial relationship to the public health, safety, or welfare of the resi-
dents of a state or municipality.128 A California rent control measure, 
the Cotati Rent Stabilization Ordinance, was upheld by the California 
Court of Appeal as reasonably related to a legitimate governmental 
purpose.129 Here, as with other rent control ordinances, the purpose 
was to “prevent exploitation of housing shortages by the imposition of 
excessive rent charges.”130 The court determined that for ordinances 
advancing a purely economic interest—as with rent control ordi-
nances—local governments may impose a distinction in treatment 
based on economic measures as long as the distinction has a “rational 
relationship” to a “legitimate public purpose.”131 The court noted that 
it was “at least debatable” that the challenged rent control ordinance’s 
economics-based standard had a rational relationship to a legitimate 
public purpose.132 
 An examination of whether a rent control ordinance relates to 
public health, safety, or welfare requires a “reasonable factual basis to 
support the legislative determination” for the regulation.133 The Su-
preme Court examined a rent control ordinance in Pennell v. City of San 
Jose.134 There, a landlord association brought suit alleging, inter alia, 
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that the ordinance was not a legitimate exercise of the police power.135 
The ordinance’s stated purpose was: 
[A]lleviat[ing] some of the more immediate needs created by 
San Jose’s housing situation. These needs include but are not 
limited to the prevention of excessive and unreasonable rent 
increases, the alleviation of undue hardships upon individual 
tenants, and the assurance to landlords of a fair and reason-
able return on the value of their property.136 
The Court evaluated this purpose to determine whether it was “arbi-
trary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legis-
lature is free to adopt;”137 the Court found that it was not, and that the 
ordinance was a legitimate exercise of the police power.138 One aspect 
of the Court’s holding was the recognition of the validity of govern-
mental intervention to regulate artificially inflated rates or prices.139 
The Court reiterated that price regulation, such as rent control, has the 
legitimate and rational goal of protecting consumer welfare.140 
 There are instances where courts found rent control ordinances to 
be invalid, despite the broad reach of the police power and the high 
level of deference given to the legislature.141 In Birkenfeld v. Berkeley, the 
Supreme Court of California determined that a city rent control ordi-
nance was not constitutional.142 The assessment of the Birkenfeld ordi-
nance, based on the relationship between the purpose of the control 
and the valid goals of the police power, took a similar approach as the 
ordinances discussed above.143 The court did not question the ordi-
nance’s objective of alleviating the “ill effects of the exploitation of a 
housing shortage.”144 Nevertheless, the court affirmed the lower court’s 
declaration that the regulation was unconstitutional and void because it 
did not bear a reasonable relationship to the regulation’s purpose.145 
Specifically, the court concluded that provisions in the ordinance that 
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imposed unreasonably low rent ceilings with an indefinite duration and 
required an unnecessarily time-intensive procedure for rent adjust-
ments were problematic.146 Since these provisions were not reasonably 
related to the proper objectives of the regulation—addressing the ex-
ploitation of a housing shortage—the court held that the rent control 
ordinance was unconstitutional.147 
B. The Validity of Condominium Conversion Moratorium Regulations 
1. Condominium Conversion Moratoria 
 Condominium conversion regulations are another area where 
courts have held that regulations affecting economic interests in prop-
erty are a valid exercise of the police power.148 There are two types of 
condominium conversion laws: those that impose disclosure require-
ments on the conversion processs, and those that impose outright mora-
toria on the conversions.149 This discussion addresses the validity of con-
versions generally, but focuses primarily on conversion moratoria. 
 Condominium conversion is most common in low-income urban 
areas with proximity to desirable urban amenities.150 Opponents of 
condominium conversion argue that such conversions create a short-
age of affordable housing and displace tenants from their homes and 
neighborhoods.151 Condominium conversion regulations first appeared 
in the 1970s, in response to a condominium building boom.152 In Chi-
cago, for instance, the city council passed a moratorium on conversions 
in 1979 after approximately 70,000 apartments were converted to con-
dominiums during the decade, the largest number of any metropolitan 
area in the United States.153 
 Condominium conversion regulations and moratoria on conver-
sion remain a relevant issue today.154 These conversions still occur 
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throughout the country and can result in increased rental prices by tak-
ing rental buildings off the market.155 In Los Angeles, City Council 
member Bill Rosendahl called for a moratorium on condominium con-
versions in August 2006.156 Rosendahl introduced the moratorium as a 
way to confront the loss of rental and affordable housing in parts of Los 
Angeles.157 He explained that “[w]e are at the point of crisis. Longtime 
residents are being forced from their homes in epidemic numbers. They 
can no longer continue to live in their neighborhoods. Our communi-
ties are being ripped apart.”158 Chicago is once again addressing the is-
sue of condominium conversion.159 In the fall of 2006, Mayor Richard 
M. Daley assembled a task force to examine ways to preserve affordable 
housing in the face of wide-spread condominium conversions.160 
2. Validity of Condominium Conversion Moratoria 
 Enabling statutes or provisions are required in order to enact con-
dominium conversion restrictions.161 Valid restrictions on condominium 
conversion must be rationally related to a legitimate public purpose.162 
In most instances, the public purpose validating a condominium conver-
sion ordinance is the protection of prospective purchasers or existing 
tenants.163 
 A common argument against condominium conversion moratoria 
is that land use regulations should not be based on the form of owner-
ship.164 In Maplewood Village Tenants Ass’n v. Maplewood Village, the Supe-
rior Court of New Jersey held that land use controls “cannot be em-
ployed by a municipality to exclude condominiums or discriminate 
against the condominium form of ownership, for it is the use rather 
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than form of ownership that is the proper concern and focus of zoning 
and planning regulation.”165 
 In Griffin Development Co. v. City of Oxnard, the Supreme Court of 
California considered whether a city could regulate the conversion of 
apartments into condominiums.166 The court looked to past cases to 
establish the standard of judicial review for condominium conversion 
ordinances as economic regulations.167 The standard employed was 
that “legislation regulating prices or otherwise restricting contractual or 
property rights [was] within the police power if its operative provisions 
[we]re reasonably related to the accomplishment of a legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose.”168 
 Accordingly, the court conducted a thorough inquiry into the spe-
cific provisions of the ordinance to determine whether it was reasona-
bly related to a legitimate governmental purpose.169 The court found 
substantial rationale for the provisions.170 For instance, the parking 
space requirement reflected statistics on the quantity of cars owned by 
homeowners and the required number of bedrooms was based on fam-
ily size of likely occupants.171 From this examination, and through reit-
eration of the elasticity of the police power, the court found that the 
regulations were plainly related to a legitimate governmental inter-
est.172 The court concluded that “the [condominium conversion] regu-
lations---reasonably related to the legitimate governmental purpose— 
[we]re a valid exercise of the city’s police power.”173 
 The California Court of Appeal evaluated a challenge to a San 
Francisco condominium conversion moratorium in Leavenworth Proper-
ties v. City of San Francisco, a case raising both equal protection and po-
lice power issues.174 The plaintiff, an apartment building owner hoping 
to convert his property into condominiums, argued that the city’s ordi-
nance was arbitrary and denied him the equal protection of the law.175 
The challenged ordinance imposed a three-year moratorium on con-
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dominium conversion.176 While the plaintiff’s challenge was not based 
on an abuse of the police power, the court still emphasized that, in 
California, condominium regulation is consistently treated as a lawful 
exercise of the police power.177 The court then examined the equal 
protection claim based on the rational basis test.178 The rational basis 
standard was used, rather than the strict scrutiny standard asserted by 
the plaintiff, because the ordinance was economic legislation.179 
 The court in Leavenworth Properties determined that the goal of the 
ordinance was to maintain available rental housing.180 The ordinance 
itself stated that part of its purpose was “[t]o preserve a reasonable bal-
ance of ownership and rental housing within the City and County of 
San Francisco.”181 The court held that this purpose was rationally re-
lated to a legitimate state interest and, thus, upheld the constitutional-
ity of the ordinance.182 
IV. The Best Tool for the Job: Can Condominium Construction 
Moratoria Validly and Effectively Confront  
Gentrification and the Condo Boom? 
 This Note examines whether an ordinance that imposes a morato-
rium on new condominium construction is an appropriate use of the 
police power.183 The analysis addresses condominium construction 
moratoria generally and considers how different purposes for the 
moratoria could lead to different outcomes in an assessment of their 
validity.184 Before determining the appropriateness of the purposes of 
these ordinances, however, authority must exist to enact the regula-
tions.185 Once municipal authority to enact a development moratorium 
is established, the next step is to determine whether the purpose, or 
purposes, of a moratorium sufficiently relate to the public’s health, 
safety, or welfare.186 Since the courts have not directly addressed the 
validity of condominium construction moratoria, this Note looks to ap-
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plicable court decisions in related matters to predict how a court might 
address a challenge to a condominium construction moratorium.187 
Analogies to rent control and condominium conversion ordinances, 
thus, provide a helpful framework for assessing the validity of condo-
minium construction moratoria.188 
A. Municipalities May Enact Land Use Moratoria 
 A municipality must have the authority to enact a land use regula-
tion, including a condominium moratorium; without authority, the 
regulation is invalid.189 Authority to enact land use regulations comes 
from the police power and, thus, requires that the regulations relate to 
the general health, safety, or welfare of the public.190 The Supreme 
Court established that use-focused ordinances addressed health, safety, 
and welfare concerns and were proper applications of the police power 
in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., when it upheld challenged zoning regula-
tions.191 The Court expanded the Euclid holding beyond zoning ordi-
nances in Berman v. Parker, when it determined that an ordinance re-
garding the redevelopment of a deteriorating area was constitutionally 
sound.192 Euclid, Berman, and many other cases since, have established 
that the police power may be used to enact land use regulations.193 
 As a result, it is now an accepted principle that municipalities have 
the authority, through the police power, to enact ordinances and regu-
lations affecting the use of land.194 This principle provides the first step 
in establishing condominium construction moratoria as valid regula-
tions.195 Still, the Court in Euclid emphasized that evaluations of zoning 
ordinances must be considered on a case-by-case basis because of the 
difficulty in precisely defining the police power and the lack of a clear 
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delineation between uses that are acceptable and unacceptable.196 
While zoning and other land use regulations are valid applications of 
the police power, this validity does not provide a blanket approval for 
all such regulations.197 Thus, the inquiry into the validity of condomin-
ium construction moratoria must go further to determine whether 
such ordinances sufficiently relate to the health, safety, or welfare of a 
municipality’s residents.198 
B. Examination of Land Use Moratoria as a Valid Exercise of the Police Power 
 A municipality’s authority to enact moratoria and other land use 
regulations does not guarantee that all such regulations will be valid— 
the particular purpose of a regulation must be a valid exercise of the 
police power.199 Because the municipal authority to regulate land use 
stems from the police power, the purpose of any particular land use 
moratorium must relate to the health, safety, or welfare of the pub-
lic.200 Land use regulations, however, are enacted to achieve many dif-
ferent goals, and can have a broad range of purposes.201 It is the role 
of state legislatures to develop and adopt these regulations in re-
sponse to the needs of their communities.202 Since land use regula-
tions are enacted through the legislative process—and not enacted by 
the courts—judicial review gives great deference to the legislature’s 
determination of needed regulations and their purposes.203 
 Accordingly, the courts view themselves as having a very narrow, 
limited role in determining whether the police power is being exer-
cised for a proper public purpose.204 The Supreme Court exemplified 
this view in Euclid, when it explained that finding an ordinance un-
constitutional under the police power requires that the regulation be 
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“arbitrary and unreasonable” with “no substantial relation to public 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”205 An analysis of the various 
purposes for condominium construction moratoria must consider the 
great deference that a court would give the legislature in reviewing a 
challenge to a moratorium regulation.206 
1. Rent Control: Regulations with an Economically Driven Purpose 
 Like moratoria, municipalities enact rent control regulations as an 
exercise of the police power.207 Therefore, these regulations are only 
upheld if they have a substantial relationship to the public health, 
safety, or welfare: the same standard that applies to condominium 
moratoria.208 Rent control ordinances provide a useful reference point 
for evaluating condominium construction moratoria because rent con-
trol ordinances have economically oriented purposes, such as stabiliz-
ing rental prices.209 
 Rent control and condominium construction regulations have il-
lustrative similarities in their purposes and goals.210 While dealing with 
the issues in different ways, rent control and condominium construc-
tion regulations address impacts on housing in specific neighborhoods 
or areas.211 These two types of regulations share the goal of preventing 
housing shortages for lower-income residents.212 Additionally, both 
types of regulations can serve as a response to an influx of more afflu-
ent individuals into a traditionally lower-income area.213 Finally, each 
demonstrates instances where regulation is used to counteract the ef-
fect of market forces on the land use and housing availability in an 
area.214 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel links in-
sufficient housing with public welfare.215 The rent control ordinance 
challenged in this case was enacted in response to the housing shortage 
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following World War I.216 The Court explained that the legislature re-
sorted to the police power in this instance based on its strong belief 
that there was a “social emergency[]caused by an insufficient supply of 
dwelling houses and apartments.”217 The Court went on to discuss the 
rent control ordinance’s purpose of relieving the serious housing prob-
lem and, thus, preventing harm to the public welfare.218 Once the 
Court linked relieving a housing shortage to the public welfare, it 
stated strongly that the ordinance addressed aspects of the public wel-
fare, “[W]hich constitute the primary and undisputed . . . basis and jus-
tification for exercise of [the police] power.”219 
 While examination of rent control ordinances does provide insight 
into evaluating condominium construction moratoria, drawing analo-
gies between the two kinds of regulations must be done cautiously.220 
Both kinds of regulations share a common goal of addressing housing 
needs in an area with changing populations or market pressures.221 
While these long-term and broad goals may be the same, the immedi-
ate purposes and effects are different.222 The differences between rent 
control ordinances and condominium construction moratoria prevent 
the direct application of cases analyzing the former to the latter.223 
 Rent control ordinances directly regulate the amount of lower-
priced housing by requiring the stabilization of rental prices.224 The 
connection to more affordably priced housing is not as direct in the 
case of condominium construction moratoria.225 The moratoria effec-
tively prevent the development of higher-priced housing, but this re-
striction does not necessarily correlate to an increased amount of lower-
priced housing.226 For example, if the moratoria were enacted in 
neighborhoods where new condominiums were being built on vacant 
lots or open land, a construction moratorium would not result in more 
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lower-priced housing unless an aspect of the moratorium was to de-
velop a plan for creating affordable housing during the construction 
freeze.227 Thus, an analysis of condominium construction moratoria, 
based on an analogy to rent control ordinances, must carefully assess 
the similarities and differences between the purposes and effects of 
these respective regulations and draw comparisons accordingly.228 
2. Condominium Conversion Moratoria 
 In addition to rent control ordinances, condominium conversion 
moratoria also provide a helpful analytical framework for assessing the 
validity of the purposes of condominium construction moratoria.229 
Like construction moratoria, condominium conversion moratoria in-
volve the issue of economic interests in property.230 Both types of mora-
toria originated in response to large influxes in condominium building 
booms, one to new construction and the other to conversion of apart-
ment buildings into condominiums.231 
 Many of the arguments currently made by communities in support 
of proposed condominium construction moratoria have been made in 
relation to conversion ordinances.232 For instance, the local discussion 
surrounding both types of regulations focuses on displacement of cur-
rent residents, a shortage of affordable housing, and changing 
neighborhood character as reasons to enact these land use controls.233 
 While the courts have not ruled on condominium construction 
moratoria, they have examined condominium conversion moratoria.234 
In Griffin Development Co. v. City of Oxnard, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia determined that a city could regulate the conversion of apart-
ments into condominiums.235 In its analysis, the court stressed that the 
legislature could restrict economic or property interests as long as the 
“operative provisions [of the regulation] [we]re reasonably related to 
the accomplishment of a legitimate governmental purpose.”236 It does 
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not directly follow from this ruling that limiting the construction of 
condominiums could be a legitimate governmental purpose as well, but 
it does suggest that this kind of regulation could also be valid as an ex-
ercise of the police power.237 
 In addition to economic interests, condominium conversion regu-
lations touch on the issue of maintaining the character or composition 
of a community.238 In Leavenworth Properties v. City of San Francisco, the 
California Court of Appeal examined a conversion moratorium with 
the purpose of “preserv[ing] a reasonable balance of ownership and 
rental housing within the City.”239 The court held that this justification 
was a legitimate state interest relating to public welfare and, thus, up-
held the constitutionality of the ordinance.240 This holding suggests 
that condominium construction moratoria with a similar purpose 
would also be found to promote a legitimate state interest and fall 
within the police power.241 A condominium construction moratorium 
based on this premise would have the goal of preserving a social bal-
ance in the area by limiting the number of newcomers moving into the 
community as homebuyers of new condominiums.242 
3. The Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore Analysis 
 Rent control and condominium conversion ordinances supply use-
ful analogies for examining condominium construction moratoria. Ex-
amining past court evaluations of growth management ordinances also 
provide examples of useful processes to assess the validity of such ordi-
nances.243 One way to evaluate the validity of condominium construc-
tion moratoria is to analyze them under the three-step process articu-
lated in Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore.244 
 First, this analysis predicts the likely effects of prohibiting condo-
minium construction in the designated area, taking into account the 
probable time frame for the moratorium.245 The analysis then identifies 
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the competing interests that are affected by the moratorium.246 Finally, 
based on the prior two determinations, the analysis requires evaluating 
whether the moratorium reasonably accommodates the competing in-
terests.247 
 The need for a case-by-case evaluation of land use regulations pre-
cludes a general application of the City of Livermore analysis to condo-
minium construction moratoria.248 Still, the analysis is helpful in pre-
dicting how various common factors of the construction moratoria 
would be considered by a court.249 For instance, as part of the City of 
Livermore analysis, potential impact on both the area directly regulated 
by the moratorium and the areas surrounding the moratorium bound-
ary must be considered.250 This aspect of the City of Livermore analysis 
broadens the public that must be considered in assessing a morato-
rium’s relationship to public health, safety, and welfare.251 Thus, a con-
dominium moratorium with the goal of slowing or eliminating the gen-
trification process in the regulated community might also have the 
unintended effect of shifting the flood of construction and individuals 
to a surrounding area.252 Depending on the interests of the surround-
ing area, this shift could have either a negative or positive effect.253 Al-
ternatively, a condominium construction moratorium that reduces the 
rate and scale of economic development in the regulated area could 
similarly impact the local economy in surrounding areas.254 These ex-
amples are just a few instances where a City of Livermore analysis would 
require weighing of the differing effects on the health, safety, and wel-
fare of individuals in the area regulated by a moratorium ordinance 
and those in surrounding areas.255 
4. Moratoria Timeframes: What Happens During the Freeze? 
 Crucial aspects of any condominium construction moratorium are 
its duration and what occurs while construction is put on hold.256 There 
is no definitively established outer time limit for moratoria beyond 
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which the regulations will be invalid.257 An evaluation of the duration of 
a moratorium would examine whether there is a reasonable relation-
ship between the purpose of the moratorium and the steps to be taken 
during the moratorium, as well as the length of the hold on construc-
tion.258 
 Comparing these moratoria to rent control and condominium 
conversion regulations suggests that a court would find that the pur-
poses behind the moratoria—preserving neighborhood character and 
addressing the effects of gentrification—could have a rational relation-
ship to public welfare.259 But the evaluation of the moratoria does not 
stop there. Even if the goal of the moratorium is valid, the regulation 
itself will not survive scrutiny unless it includes provisions establishing 
the steps that will be taken during the moratorium to address the prob-
lems targeted by the regulation.260 A court’s evaluation of moratorium 
provisions would likely be similar to the California Supreme Court’s 
examination of a condominium conversion ordinance in Griffin Devel-
opment Co.261 There, the regulation was valid because it served a legiti-
mate governmental interest, and the operative provisions had a reason-
able relationship to the accomplishment of that interest.262 
 Thus, a moratorium cannot put a hold on condominium construc-
tion solely to prevent changes to neighborhood character.263 The pur-
pose for freezing construction must be to allow the municipality time to 
take steps that address the adverse impacts of the construction.264 For 
example, if rapid condominium construction was displacing lower-
income residents in a neighborhood, it could be appropriate for the 
city to institute a moratorium while it developed a plan to provide more 
affordable housing in the area.265 It could also be appropriate to have a 
moratorium on condominium construction—where a building boom 
was stressing a neighborhood’s infrastructure or encroaching on open 
space—while the city assessed implementing new land use controls or 
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developed an overall land use plan to guide future construction.266 A 
proper moratorium will end once the indicated steps are taken, at 
which point development may resume, but with new controls in place 
to manage the impacts of the new development.267 
5. Effectiveness of Valid Condominium Construction Moratoria 
 The effectiveness of a condominium construction moratorium is 
another important consideration for cities exploring the use of this land 
use tool.268 Establishing the validity of a moratorium targeted at gentrifi-
cation under the police power does not guarantee that the regulation 
will effectively and efficiently address the needs of the community.269 
Moratoria are temporary in nature and are limited in the role they can 
play in slowing and controlling condominium development in an 
area.270 Moratoria cannot permanently limit growth in an area; zoning 
or other long-term growth management controls must be put in place 
during the moratoria for them to achieve long-lasting effects.271 Pro-
posed moratoria should be carefully considered to determine whether 
freezing development is necessary, or whether other long-term controls 
can be implemented without moratoria.272 
Conclusion 
 Condominium construction moratoria provide a potential way for 
municipalities to confront the impact of rapid condominium develop-
ment. By limiting the number of condominiums built in a certain area, 
these moratoria may prevent the displacement of local residents due to 
rising property costs and may preserve local community character. In 
order for legislatures to enact these regulations—through the exercise 
of the police power—the regulations’ purposes must have a sufficient 
relationship to public health, safety, or welfare. 
 Each condominium construction moratorium must be evaluated 
individually to determine its validity. An assessment of the purposes and 
impacts of a moratorium must consider the effects to both the area tar-
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geted by the regulation and the surrounding areas likely to be indi-
rectly impacted. Based on determinations of the validity of rent control 
ordinances and condominium conversion moratoria, a construction 
moratorium with the purpose of preserving the economic and social 
composition of a community would most likely be valid under the po-
lice power as long as its operative provisions were related to its proper 
purpose. 
 Despite the strong likelihood of validity of condominium construc-
tion moratoria, planners and regulators should only resort to this drastic 
land use control when the circumstances in a local community cannot 
be addressed through other growth management measures. Moratoria 
are politically charged tools that elicit strong responses from community 
members. Because of their volatile nature, they should only be used 
when a community must quickly freeze development to address pressing 
needs, such as insufficient infrastructure or the availability of affordable 
housing. A moratorium’s effectiveness turns on what is accomplished 
during the development freeze, rather than the halt in construction it-
self. 
 Thus, while community members may view a moratorium as a per-
fect solution to stopping rapid construction and social change in the 
neighborhood, a moratorium is not a permanent solution. A morato-
rium cannot last indefinitely, and once it is lifted the economic and so-
cial forces will continue to impact the community. A valid and effective 
moratorium will use the time during the building freeze to develop 
growth management controls that will steer these forces and new 
growth in a positive direction. 
